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A LOOK AT THE EXTRAJUDICIAL SOURCE
DOCTRINE UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 455
Liteky v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1147 (1994)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Liteky v. United States,' the United States Supreme Court held
that 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), which provides that ajudge "shall disqualify
himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably
be questioned," is subject to the limitation of the extrajudicial source
doctrine. 2 The Court determined that the absence of the word "per-
sonal" in § 455(a) does not preclude the doctrine's application. In
reaching this conclusion, the Court reasoned that the textual basis for
the application of the doctrine to § 455 (a) is the pejorative connota-
tion of the words "bias or prejudice," which indicates a predisposition
that is wrongful or inappropriate. 3 According to the Court, however,
the extrajudicial source doctrine is not a per se rule and, thus, is
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for recusal. 4 Instead,
the source of bias is one factor a judge should consider in recusal. 5
Applying this holding to the facts of the case, the Court found that the
judge did not have to recuse himself, since the grounds that petitioner
asserted were best characterized as the judge's attempts at routine
trial administration. 6
This Note argues that the Court, by subjecting § 455(a) to the
limitation of the extrajudicial source doctrine, ignored the plain lan-
guage and the legislative history of this statute. After examining the
history of the 1974 amendments to § 455 and the split in the circuits
deciding this issue, this Note examines the inconsistencies in the
Court's decision. Although Justice Kennedy's concurrence is better
reasoned than the majority opinion, this Note diverges from the con-
currence as well. Finally, this Note proposes that the standard for all
1 114 S. Ct. 1147 (1994).
2 Id. at 1157. The extrajudicial source doctrine provides that a judge's bias or preju-
dice is grounds for recusal if the bias or prejudice arose outside of his judicial functions.
See United States v. Baltistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191, 1202 (7th Cir. 1985).
3 Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1154-55.
4 Id. at 1157.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 1157-58.
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allegations of an apparent fixed predisposition, extrajudicial or other-
wise, follows from the statute itself. whether the charge of lack of im-
partiality is grounded in facts that would create a reasonable doubt
concerning the judge's impartiality, not in the mind of the judge, or
the litigant filing the motion under 28 U.S.C. § 455, but rather in the
mind of a detached, objective observer.7
II. BACKGROUND
A. THE HISTORY OF § 455 (a)
Prior to 1974, § 455 required a federal judge to disqualify
himself-
in any case in which he has a substantial interest, has been of counsel, is
or has been a material witness, or is so related to or connected with any
party or his attorney as to render it improper, in his opinion, for him to
sit on the trial, appeal, or other proceedings therein.8
In 1974, responding to certain circuits' articulation of a "duty to sit"9
in close cases, and criticism of § 455's subjectiveness, Congress
amended § 455.10
In amending § 455, Congress adopted the American Bar Associa-
tion's Code of Judicial Conduct (ABA Code), Canon 3C, with only
minor changes.1 As explicitly noted in the legislative history of § 455,
Congress' objectives in adopting Canon 3C were to: (1) conform
§ 455 to the ABA Code; (2) increase public confidence in the imparti-
ality of the judiciary by replacing the subjective standard of the former
§ 455 with an objective standard; and (3) eradicate the "duty to sit.12
In keeping with these objectives, Congress attempted to "broaden
and clarify the grounds for judicial disqualification."13 The current
§ 455 contains two subsections where recusal may be appropriate.
Subsection (a) establishes the general standard for disqualification. It
provides that any judge "shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in
which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned."14 The legisla-
7 United States v. Cowden, 545 F.2d 257, 265 (1st Cir. 1976).
8 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1988).
9 The "duty to sit" obligated judges to resolve close questions on disqualification in
favor of non-recusal under § 455. Edwards v. United States, 334 F.2d 360, 362 n.2 (5th Cir.
1964).
10 H.R. REP. No. 1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 5 (1974); S. REP. No. 419, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. 1, 5 (1973).
11 Id. Prior to its adoption, Canon 3C was superfluous since it was more restrictive than
§ 455 and provided that if it conflicted with less restrictive statutes, the judge would only
have to follow the less restrictive statute.
12 H.R. Rm'. No. 1453 at 5; S. REP. No. 419 at 5.
13 Id.
14 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1988).
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ture incorporated an objective standard in § 455(a) for measuring the
appearance of partiality "to promote public confidence in the imparti-
ality of the judicial process by saying, in effect, if there is a reasonable
factual basis for doubting the judge's impartiality, he should disqualify
himself and let another judge preside over the case."' 5 Furthermore,
by making disqualification mandatory whenever ajudge's "impartiality
might reasonably be questioned," the amendment eradicated the
duty-to-sit.' 6 In this manner, the changes to § 455 codified each of
Congress' stated objectives. Apart from the objective standard of
§ 455(a), § 455(b) enumerates specific circumstances, which if pres-
ent, require a judge to recuse himself.'7
B. COMPARISON OF § 455 WITH § 144
28 U.S.C. § 144 was the first provision enacted requiring district
judge recusal for bias in general. Section 144 was initially adopted in
1911 and remains relatively unchanged. It states:
Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a
timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is
pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor
of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further therein, but
another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceedings ... 18
15 H.R. REP. No. 1453 at5; S. REP. No. 419 at5. Thus, § 455(a) is self-enforcing, in that
it places the burden of recusal on the judge.
16 See id.
17 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1988). Subsection (b) states that ajudge "shall also disqualify him-
self in the following circumstances:
(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowl-
edge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding-
(2) Where in private practice he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a
lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer
concerning the matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness concerning
it;
(3) Where he has served in governmental employment and in such capacity partici-
pated as counsel, adviser or material witness concerning the proceeding or expressed an
opinion concerning the merits of the particular case in controversy;
(4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child
residing in his household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in
a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the
outcome of the proceeding-
(5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of
them, or the spouse of such a person:
(i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a party;
(ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding-
(iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially affected by
the outcome of the proceeding,
(iv) Is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in the proceeding."
Id.
18 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1982).
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Although the legislative history of § 144 suggests that it may provide
for a peremptory and automatic removal of a judge on a party's mo-
tion, the courts have consistently construed the statute narrowly,
thereby making disqualification unlikely.19 Unlike § 455, § 144 is not
self-enforcing. 20 Instead, the party alleging the bias must file an affi-
davit with the challenged judge stating "the facts and the reasons for
the belief that bias or prejudice exists." 21 Judges examining the affida-
vit must accept the facts as true, but may evaluate the legal sufficiency
of the affidavit 22 To determine the legal sufficiency, the courts have
imposed a "bias-in-fact" standard, as opposed to the "appearance of
bias" standard required under § 455.23 A judge may be disqualified
under § 144 only after the court finds that the affidavit is timely24 and
legally sufficient.2 5 Section 144's requirements place a heavy burden
on the party seeking recusal. To prevail, the party must: 1) allege
specific facts showing bias; 2) prove that these facts amount to per-
sonal bias; and 3) show that the facts are sufficient to convince a rea-
sonable person that bias actually exists.2 6 In contrast, revised § 455
takes a more liberalized approach to judicial disqualification, by re-
quiring merely an appearance of bias and by doing away with the affi-
davit requirement of § 144.27
C. THE EXTRAJUDICIAL SOURCE DOCTRINE
The extrajudicial source doctrine is rooted in § 144.28 This doc-
trine mandates that judges may be disqualified from a case only when
19 Seth E. Bloom, Judicial Bias and Financial Interest as Grounds for Disqualification of Fed-
eral Judges, 35 CASE W. REs. L. Rxv. 662, 666 (1985).
20 See United States v. Conforte, 624 F.2d 869, 880 (9th Cir. 1980). Although § 455 is
self-enforcing, parties to the action may also assert its provisions. Id.
21 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1982).
22 Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 36 (1921).
23 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1982). Subsection (a) of§ 455 requires an appearance of bias stan-
dard: a judge is to recuse himself in cases in which "his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned." 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1988).
24 Section 144 requires the party to file the affidavit ten days before the beginning of
the term. 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1982).
25 United States v. Alabama, 828 F.2d 1532, 1540 (11th Cir. 1987).
26 Id. (citing Parrish v. Board of Comm'rs, 524 F.2d 98, 100 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976)).
27 See Bloom, supra note 19, at 674-75. Disqualification of a judge was very difficult
under § 144, whereas under the amended § 455, the benefit of the doubt is now placed in
favor of recusal. United States v. Alabama, 828 F.2d at 1540.
28 The Supreme Court announced the extrajudicial source doctrine in United States v.
Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966), which cited Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22
(1921) as the basis for the doctrine. In Berger the Supreme Court held that ajudge could
not recuse herself because of adverse rulings made, since such rulings are reviewable on
appeal. 255 U.S. at 31.
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their bias stems from an extrajudicial source.29 "Extrajudicial" refers
to a bias that does not derive from evidence or the conduct of parties
that the judge observes during the course of proceedings.30 Most
courts rely on the presence of the term "personal" in § 144, as well as
the section's requirement that the party file the affidavit ten days
before the beginning of the term, as clear sources of the extrajudicial
source doctrine. 31 The term "personal" is regarded as the antithesis
of judicial. 32 "Personal characterizes an attitude of extrajudicial ori-
gin, derived non coramjudiciae ... clearly the prejudgment that the
statute guards against."33 Further, courts have reasoned that because
the party must file the affidavit ten days prior to the beginning of
term, the events leading to recusal could not possibly arise from facts
revealed during litigation.3 4
D. THE SPLIT IN THE CIRCUITS
In enumerating the requirements of § 455, Congress did not
specify whether the source of a judge's bias affects whether it is rea-
sonable to question a judge's impartiality. As a result, the circuits
have been split over whether bias that results from a judge's involve-
ment in earlier judicial proceedings concerning parties to a present
action demands recusal under § 455.
The majority of circuits have held that the extrajudicial source
doctrine does apply to § 455(a).3 5 The D.C. Circuit as well as the
Third, Fourth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have expressly refused to
entertain a recusal claim where the grounds for bias stemmed from
judicial proceedings.36 Based on the presence of language similar to
that in § 144, these courts have applied the extrajudicial source doc-
trine to § 455(b) (1).a7 Determining that § 455(b) is, in tram, a limita-
tion on § 455(a), the courts have extended the extrajudicial source
29 Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 290-91 (3d Cir. 1980).
So Id.
31 E.g., Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1921); Exparte American Steel Barrel Co.,
230 U.S. 35 (1913); United States v. Baltistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191, 1199 (7th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 132 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933
(1977); Craven v. United States, 22 F.2d 605, 607-08 (1st Cir. 1927).
32 Baltistrier4 779 F.2d at 1202; Haldeman, 559 F.2d at 132; Craven, 22 F.2d at 607-08.
33 Craven, 22 F.2d at 607-08.
34 Berger, 255 U.S. at 34-36; American Steel 230 U.S. at 44.
35 See United States v. Barry, 961 F.2d 260, 263 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Johnson v. Trueblood,
629 F.2d 287, 291 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v. Mitchell, 886 F.2d 667, 671 (4th Cir.
1989); Hale v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 756 F.2d 1322, 1329 (8th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Alabama, 828 F.2d 1532, 1545-46 (11th Cir. 1987).
36 See Christopher R. Carton, Comment, Disqualifying Federal Judgesfor Bias: A Considera-
tion of the Extrajudicial Bias Limitation for Disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), 24 SEroN
HALL L. REv. 2057, 2061 n.25 (1994).
37 See id. at 2066.
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doctrine to § 455(a). These circuits provide little justification for this
statutory construction beyond pointing to the absence of any discus-
sion by Congress, prior to amending § 455, regarding eradication of
the extrajudicial source doctrine.38
The Fifth and Sixth Circuits have held that § 455 and § 144 "must
be construed in pan mateia."39 Therefore, "[dlisqualification under
§ 455(a) must be predicated as previously under § 144, upon extraju-
dicial conduct rather than onjudicial conduct."40 Similarly, the Ninth
Circuit has concluded that § 455 and § 144 are complementary.41 Ac-
cordingly, the same substantive standard of bias applies to both
sections.42
In the minority, the First and Second Circuits have concluded
that Congress intended to abandon the extrajudicial source doctrine
upon adopting the 1974 Amendments.43 These Circuits rely on the
plain meaning of the statute and the legislative history as the basis for
this conclusion.4 4 The test these circuits have applied, as first articu-
lated in United States v. Cowden,45 is "whether the charge of lack of
impartiality is grounded in facts that would create a reasonable doubt
concerning the judge's impartiality, not in the mind of the judge him-
self or even necessarily in the mind of the litigant filing the motion
under 28 U.S.C. § 455, but rather in the mind of a reasonable man."40
38 See id.
39 Easley v. University of Mich. Bd. of Regents, 853 F.2d 1351 (6th Cir. 1988); Davis v.
Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 517 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
Par materia is a rule of statutory construction stating that "statutes which relate to the same
subject matter should be read, construed and applied together so that the legislature's
intention can be gathered from the whole of the enactment...." BLAcK's LAw DicrioNAR"
791 (6th ed. 1990).
40 Easley, 853 F.2d at 1351.
41 See United States v. Sibla, 624 F.2d 864, 868 (9th Cir. 1980). Moreover, the Ninth
Circuit suggested that "the net result of the complementary sections is that a party submit-
ting a proper motion and affidavit under § 144 can get two bites of the apple. If after
considering all the circumstances, the judge declines to grant recusal pursuant to
§§ 455(a) and (b) (1), the judge still must determine the legal sufficiency of the affidavit
filed pursuant to § 144." Id.
42 Id. at 867. In United States v. Olander, 584 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1978), the Ninth Cir-
cuit noted that it was incorrect as a matter of statutory interpretation to interpret § 455(a)
as setting forth a different test for disqualification from that of § 455(b) (1). This is espe-
cially so because both the drafters of the ABA Code and Congress in adopting § 455(b) (1),
were careful to follow the language of § 144. Olander, 584 F.2d at 882.
4 See United States v. Chantal, 902 F.2d 1018, 1022 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v.
Coven, 662 F.2d 162, 168 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 916 (1982).
44 Id.




III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On November 16, 1990, petitioners Patrick Liteky, Charles Liteky,
and Father Roy Bourgeois poured human blood on the walls, carpets,
and display cases of the Fort Benning Military Reservation.47 Petition-
ers were politically motivated to perform these acts in protest of the
United States government's involvement in El Salvador. In particular,
petitioners were responding to the murders of six Jesuit priests in El
Salvador one year earlier.48 Charged with willful destruction of
United States property in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1361, 49 petitioners
were tried by a jury in the District Court for the Middle District of
Georgia.
Prior to trial, petitioners moved to disqualify DistrictJudge Rob-
ert Elliott pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).-50 Premising their argument
on the fact that Judge Elliott had presided over a 1983 bench trial
involving Father Roy Bourgeois, in which Father Bourgeois had been
convicted of various misdemeanors committed during a protest at the
same Fort Benning Military Reservation, petitioners alleged that
§ 455 (a) required the Judge to "disqualify himself in any proceeding
in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned."51 The peti-
tioners' motion claimed that Judge Elliott had displayed "impatience,
disregard for the defense, and animosity" toward Bourgeois, his co-
defendants, and their beliefs both during and after the 1983 trial.52
Specifically, petitioners pointed to the following actions by Judge Elli-
ott during the 1983 trial, in support of their motion: (1) stating at the
outset of the trial that its purpose was to try a criminal case and not to
provide a political forum; (2) observing after Bourgeois' opening
statement53 that it ought to have been directed toward the anticipated
evidentiary showing; (3) limiting the defense counsel's cross-examina-
tion; (4) judicial questioning of witnesses; (5) periodically cautioning
defense counsel to confine his questions to issues material to the trial;
(6) cautioning witnesses to keep answers responsive to actual ques-
tions directed at material issues; (7) admonishing Bourgeois during
closing arguments that it was not the time to make a political speech;
(8) interrupting one of Bourgeois' co-defendants during their closing
arguments to warn him to cease introduction of new facts and to re-
47 United States v. Liteky, 114 S. Ct. 1147, 1150 (1994).
48 Brief for the United States at 2, Liteky v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1147 (1994) (No.
92-6921).
49 Section 1361 prohibits "willfully injur[ing] ... any property of the United States." 18
U.S.C. § 1361 (1983).
50 Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1150.
51 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1988).
52 Litey, 114 S. Ct. at 1150.
53 The opening statement described the purpose of his political protest.
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strict him to a discussion of evidence already presented; and (9) giv-
ing Bourgeois an excessive sentence.54 After considering each of
these allegations, Judge Elliott rejected petitioners' motion, reasoning
that matters arising from judicial proceedings are not grounds for
recusal. 55 In addition, Judge Elliott concluded that all other factual
allegations relied on in the motion to recuse, and its supporting docu-
ments, were erroneous, in that an objective disinterested party would
not entertain a significant doubt about the court's impartiality.56
Following the denial of petitioners' motion, the case proceeded
to trial. Judge Elliott agreed, at the onset of the trial, to allow defense
counsel to state the political motivation behind petitioners' actions in
their opening statements.57 While the Judge also permitted petition-
ers to testify regarding their motivations, the Judge adamantly main-
tained that he would not allow long speeches discussing government
policy.58 When defense counsel began discussing events in El Salva-
dor during the opening, however, Judge Elliott sustained the prosecu-
tion's objection and told defense counsel to limit his statement to
what he intended the evidence to show. 59 At the close of the prosecu-
tion's case, petitioners' renewed their motion under § 455(a), adding
"the judge's admonishing [of Bourgeois] in front of the jury regard-
ing the opening statement and the Judge's unspecified admonishing
[of] others" as grounds for disqualification.60 AfterJudge Elliott's sec-
ond denial of petitioners' § 455(a) motion, the petitioners were con-
victed for the willful destruction of United States property.
61
Claiming that the District Judge wrongfully denied their recusal mo-
tion, the petitioners appealed.62 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
lower court's decision, holding that "matters arising out of the course
ofjudicial proceedings are not a proper basis for recusal." 63 The peti-
tioners next filed a petition for certiorari with the United States
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Brief for the United States at 10, Liteky (No. 92-6921).




61 Id. The court sentenced Patrick and Charles Liteky to a prison term of six months
and Father Bourgeois to a term of sixteen months. Brief for the United States at 2, Liteky
(No. 92-6921). All three defendants were fined $636.47 in restitution. Id.
62 Liteky, 973 F.2d at 910.
65 Id. (citing United States v. Alabama, 828 F.2d 1532, 1540 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. de-
nied, 487 U.S. 1210 (1988)); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 614 F.2d 958 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980); Davis v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs., 517 F.2d 1044 (5th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976)).
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whether required recusal under § 455(a) is subject to the limitation of
the "extrajudicial source doctrine," and to resolve the inconsistency
among the circuits.64
II. SUMMARY OF THE OPINIONS
A. MAJORITY OPINION
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority,65 affirmed the decision of
the Court of Appeals, holding that § 455(a) is subject to the limitation
of the extrajudicial source doctrine.66 Justice Scalia reached this con-
clusion after examining the origin of the extrajudicial source doc-
trine, the doctrine's applicability to § 455(a), and its resulting
implications on recusal jurisprudence and the facts of this case.67
The Court first reviewed the history of the extrajudicial source
doctrine to better understand its scope. The Court determined that
Congress promulgated the extrajudicial source doctrine in response
to 28 U.S.C. § 144.68 Requiring judicial disqualification for "personal
bias or prejudice," § 144 contains language similar to the language in
§ 455(b) (1).69 The petitioners argued that because the word "per-
sonal" in § 144 provides the basis for the extrajudicial source doctrine,
the absence of the word "personal" in § 455 (a) precludes its applica-
tion to this case. 70 Justice Scalia rejected this textual argument, rea-
soning that "bias and prejudice [are] not divided into the 'personal'
kind, which is offensive, and the official kind, which is perfectly all
right."71 Rather, the term "personal" is simply an adjective that em-
phasizes the "idiosyncratic nature of bias and prejudice,"-disposi-
tions that are never appropriate. 72 Furthermore, the Court concluded
that interpreting the term "personal" in the manner suggested by peti-
tioners would create a complete dichotomy between court-acquired
and extrinsically acquired bias, and produce absurd results.
7 3
The Court found that the origin of the extrajudicial source doc-
trine is the pejorative connotation of the words "bias or prejudice" in
§ 144.74 The terms "bias" and "prejudice" "connote a favorable or un-
64 Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1150.
65 Chief justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Thomas, and Ginsburg joined in
Justice Scalia's opinion.
66 Id. at 1158.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 1152.
69 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1982); 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1988).
70 Brief for Petitioner at 15, Liteky v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1147 (1994) (No. 92-6921).
71 Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1154.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 1155.
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favorable disposition or opinion that is somehow wrongful or inappro-
priate, either because it is undeserved, or because it rests upon
knowledge that the subject ought not to possess, or because it is exces-
sive in degree."75 The Court recognized that not all of ajudge's unfa-
vorable dispositions toward an individual are the result of "bias or
prejudice." 76 Requiring judges to be impartial does not mean that
they must display "child-like innocence, [for] [i]f the judge did not
form judgements of the actors in those court-house dramas called tri-
als, he could never render decisions."77 The "extrajudicial source"
doctrine developed as a mechanism to help ensure thatjudges do not
recuse themselves unless their "judicial predispositions.., go beyond
what is normal and acceptable."78 Because of the similarity in lan-
guage between § 455(b) (1) and § 144, the Court recognized that the
extrajudicial source doctrine clearly applied to § 455(b) (1). The
Court then identified an equivalent pejorative connotation of the
term "partiality" in § 455(a). 79 As a result, the Court concluded that
the same extrajudicial source limitation in § 144 and § 455(b) (1),
which derives from this pejorative connotation, limits § 455 (a) as
well.80 Based on the pejorative connotation of these terms, Justice
Scalia concluded that the sort of "child-like innocence that elimina-
tion of the 'extrajudicial source' limitation would require is not
reasonable.""'
As a matter of statutory construction, Justice Scalia also explained
that if § 455(a) did not contain a limitation which § 455(b) (1) con-
tained, the statute would contradict itself.8 2 Subsection (a), according
to Justice Scalia, acts as a "catch all" section which both expands the
protections provided by subsection (b), and duplicates some of these
protections with regard to bias or prejudice, and interest or relation-
ship.83 Thus, within these overlapping sections, it would be inconsis-
tent to interpret § 455(a) as implicitly eliminating a limitation
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id. (citing In reJ.P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 654 (2d Cir. 1943)).
78 Id.
79 The Court stated "[p]artiality does not refer to all favoritism, but only to such as is,
for some reason, wrongful or inappropriate." Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1156.
80 Id. The Court also noted that even if the pejorative connotation of "partiality" were
not enough to import the "extrajudicial source" doctrine into § 455(a), the "reasonable-
ness" limitation in this section w6uld have the same effect. Id. This limitation refers to the







specifically set forth in § 455(b).84
Though Justice Scalia held that mandatory recusal under
§ 455(a) is subject to the extrajudicial source limitation, he rejected a
per se extrajudicial source rule.8 5 Rather, Justice Scalia noted that it
would be better to speak of the existence of an "extrajudicial source
factor" rather than an "extrajudicial source doctrine" in recusaIjuris-
prudence.86 Justice Scalia elaborated that a judicial opinion derived
from an outside source is neither a necessary condition nor a suffi-
cient condition for "bias or prejudice" recusal, reasoning that bias is
no less offensive when it stems from ajudicial proceeding.8 7 Thus, the
Court held that there will be some circumstances where a predisposi-
tion developed during the course of a trial will suffice for recusal,88
and other circumstances where a predisposition developed outside of
the trial will not suffice. 89
Justice Scalia then discussed two implications of the presence of
the extrajudicial source factor.90 First, he noted that judicial rulings
alone will almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality
motion.91 By themselves, they cannot show reliance upon an extraju-
dicial source, and only in the rarest of circumstances can they evi-
dence the degree of favoritism or antagonism required when no
extrajudicial source is involved.92 Second, opinions formed by the
judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the
course of the current proceeding, or of prior proceedings, do not rise
to the level of recusal unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or
antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.93 Thus, Jus-
tice Scalia noted that, ordinarily, neither judicial remarks made dur-
ing the course of a trial that are critical, disapproving of, or even
hostile to counsel, the parties, or their cases, nor a judge's efforts at
courtroom administration support a bias or partiality challenge.94
In the final section of the Court's opinion, Justice Scalia applied
the facts of the instant case to the foregoing principles. The Court
found that the grounds for petitioners' motion, which consisted of
judicial rulings, routine trial administration efforts, and ordinary ad-
84 Id.
85 Id. at 1157.
86 Id.
87 Id.









monishments to counsel and to witnesses, were insufficient to support
a recusal motion.95 All occurred within the context of judicial pro-
ceedings, and neither relied upon knowledge acquired outside such
proceedings nor displayed deep-seated and unequivocal antagonism
that would render fair judgment impossible. 96
B. JUSTICE KENNEDY'S CONCURRENCE
Although Justice Kennedy applauded the majority's departure
from a per se extrajudicial source rule, he wrote separately to express
his disapproval of the "undue emphasis" the Court placed "upon the
source of the challenged mindset in determining whether disqualifica-
tion is mandated by § 455(a)." 97 Justice Kennedy concluded that the
proper inquiry under § 455(a) is the appearance of partiality rather
than its origin.98
Justice Kennedy agreed that, as an empirical matter, there is
some utility to the distinction between extrajudicial and intrajudicial
sources,99 but he concluded that the majority took this distinction too
far.'00 He reasoned that the Court erred in adopting a standard
which places all but dispositive weight upon the source of the alleged
disqualification.' 0 ' Justice Kennedy asserted that the majority's stan-
dard is not a fair interpretation of the statute and is insufficient to
serve and protect the integrity of the courts.'0 2 Furthermore, he con-
tended that in practice, the standard will be difficult to distinguish
from the extrajudicial source rule that the Court claims to reject.' 03
Justice Kennedy further noted that the Court's standard, which
asks "whether fairjudgment is impossible," 0 4 bears little resemblance
to the statutory standard which Congress specifically adopted:
95 Id. at 1158.
96 Id.
97 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
98 Id. at 1158-59 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
99 Justice Kennedy recognized that "doubts about a judge's impartiality seldom have
merit when the challenged mindset arises as a result of some judicial proceeding." Id. at
1160 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Thus, the dichotomy between extrajudicial and in-
trajudicial sources does provide a "convenient shorthand to explain how courts have con-
fronted the disqualification issue in circumstances that recur with some frequency." Id.
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
100 See id. at 1161 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
101 I. (KennedyJ., concurring).
102 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
103 Id. (KennedyJ., concurring).
104 Justice Kennedy is referring to the portion of the majority's holding that states that
opinions arising during the course ofjudicial proceedings require disqualification under
§ 455 (a) only if they "display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair
judgment impossible." Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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whether a judge's "impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 0 5
This divergence from Congress' standard defeats the intended goal of
§ 455(a), because it requires examining the judge's state of mind,
rather than focusing on the overall appearance of the judge's disposi-
tion to a detached observer.106 Justice Kennedy argued that the ma-
jority's standard would have a negative bearing on the integrity of the
courts, as well as the interests of the litigants, because of its limited,
almost preclusive character.10 7 Since "[tihere are bound to be cir-
cumstances where a judge's demeanor or attitude would raise reason-
able questions concerning impartiality, but would not devolve to the
point where one would think fair judgment impossible," 08 this nar-
row construction defies the flexible scope that Congress intended
§ 455(a) to have.10 9 Justice Kennedy proposed that the proper stan-
dard, which should apply to all allegations of fixed predispositions re-
gardless of their source, follows from the language of the statute:
"disqualification is required if an objective observer would entertain a
reasonable question about the judge's impartiality."110
Finally, Justice Kennedy pointed out that the structure of § 455
clearly indicates that subsections (a) and (b), while addressing many
of the same underlying circumstances, operate independently."'
Moreover, Justice Kennedy noted that Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisi-
tion Corp.112 explicitly rejected any interplay between subsections (a)
and (b).11- Justice Kennedy further noted that one of the distinct
concerns of § 455 (a) is the appearance of impartiality, whether or not
§ 455(a) addresses the alleged disqualifying circumstance. 114 Accord-
ingly, § 455(b) does not govern § 455(a) as the majority holds. 115
Applying his construction of § 455 to the case, Justice Kennedy
concluded that the actions ofJudge Elliott did not raise any inference
of bias or partiality. 116
105 Id. at 1162 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
106 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
107 Id. at 1161 (Kennedy, J., concurring). For example, a challenge would fail even if it
were shown that an unfair hearing were likely, for it is possible to argue that a fair hearing
would be possible nonetheless. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
108 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
109 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
110 Id. at 1162 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
111 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
112 486 U.S. 847 (1988).
113 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
114 Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1163 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
115 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).




This Note concludes that the Supreme Court improperly applied
an extrajudicial source limitation to § 455(a), because the text of the
statute, as well as its legislative history clearly indicate that Congress
did not intend the doctrine to apply to § 455 (a). Furthermore, this
Note asserts that neither recusal jurisprudence nor public policy sup-
port the holding that the extrajudicial source doctrine applies to
§ 455(a). Rather, the proper standard for disqualification under
§ 455(a) is whether the charge of lack of impartiality is grounded in
facts that create a reasonable doubt concerning the judge's impartial-
ity, not in the mind of the judge or in the mind of the movant, but in
the mind of a reasonable person." 7
A. THE TEXT OF § 455 (a)
The plain meaning of the statutory language reveals that Con-
gress did not intend for the extrajudicial source doctrine to limit
§ 455 (a). Rather, the language of § 455 (a) and § 455 (b) suggests that
these subsections function autonomously.
In determining whether the extrajudicial source doctrine applies
to § 455(a), courts must ascertain the statute's plain meaning by ex-
amining the particular language at issue and the language and design
of the statute as a whole."" If the statute is clear and unambiguous,
courts must give effect to Congress' unambiguously expressed intent
and cannot pay deference to a contrary interpretation." 9 Section 455
is facially unambiguous. The plain language of § 455 (a) does not con-
tain an extrajudicial source limitation. Subsection (a) demands that a
judge recuse himself "where his impartiality might reasonably be ques-
tioned.' 20 There is no stated requirement that recusal is mandated
only in instances where ajudge's partiality arises extrajudicially, nor is
there any indication from the statute as a whole that § 455(b) (1)'s
extrajudicial source requirement limits § 455(a).12 ' The only logical
conclusion from the plain language of the statute is that Congress in-
117 United States v. Cowden, 545 F.2d 257, 265 (lst Cir. 1976).
118 K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) (finding section 526 of the
Tariff Act of 1930 to be sufficiently ambiguous and, thus, allowing deference to the Secre-
tary of Treasury's interpretation of the Act).
119 Id.
120 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1988).
121 On the contrary, the language of § 455(a) suggests that Congress intended it to act
as a "catch-all phrase". The language of § 455(a) is broad and sweeping. it requires
recusal "in any proceeding in which [a judge's] impartiality might reasonably be ques-
tioned." 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1988). Application of the extrajudicial source doctrine to
§ 455(a) will narrow the scope of this subsection, thereby hindering the statute's intended
function of restoring public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary.
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tended § 455(a) to include appearances of partiality which arise both
judicially and extrajudicially.
The extrajudicial source doctrine primarily arose in connection
with § 144. The presence of the word "personal" in § 144, as well as its
requirement that the party file an affidavit ten days in advance of pro-
ceedings provided the statutory basis for the application of this doc-
trine.122 "Personal" as used in the phrase "personal bias or prejudice"
is another way of saying "extrajudicial." 123 Because § 455(b) (1) also
uses the term "personal," the extrajudicial source doctrine applies to
recusal motions brought under that subsection. 124 Unlike § 144 and
§ 455(b) (1), § 455(a) does not use the term "personal."125 Hence,
the justification for applying the extrajudicial source doctrine to
§ 455(a) is absent. 126 Additionally, the courts relied on the presence
of the filing limitation as another justification for the extrajudicial
source doctrine, reasoning that because the party had to file the affi-
davit ten days prior to the beginning of the term, the events leading to
recusal could not possibly arise from facts adduced during the litiga-
tion. 12 7 Section 455(a) does not have a filing requirement, thus, there
is no basis for applying the extrajudicial source doctrine to
§ 455(a). 12 8
Subsection 455(a) and subsection 455(b) are autonomous. 129
Subsection 455(b) begins: "he [the judge] shall also disqualify himself
in the following circumstances.. ."10 Subsection (b) enumerates
specific circumstances mandating recusal; these include instances of
actual bias as well as specific instances of assumed bias.131 The inclu-
sion of the term "also" suggests that § 455 (a) and § 455 (b) have in-
dependent force. 132 The language of the statute does not suggest,
contrary to the majority's construction, that § 455(b) imposes a limita-
tion on § 455(a). 133 Moreover, § 455(a) requires merely an appear-
122 See Liteky v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1147, 1165 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
123 United States v. Baltistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191, 1202 (7th Cir. 1985).
124 Id.
125 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1988).
126 United States v. Chantal, 902 F.2d 1018, 1023-24 (1st Cir. 1990).
127 Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 34-36 (1921).
128 Chanta4 902 F.2d at 1023. It is important to note that circuits which rely on the
presence of the term "personal" and the filing limitation as a basis for the extrajudicial
source doctrine, still find that, despite the absence of these two specifications in § 455 (a),
the extrajudicial source doctrine also applies to § 455(a). The circuits provide no rationale
for their interpretation.
129 Liteky v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1147, 1162 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
130 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1988) (emphasis added).
131 See id.
132 Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1163 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
133 Id. (Kennedy J, concurring).
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ance of bias, while § 455 (b) requires bias in fact.' 34 Subsection 455 (e)
provides further textual confirmation of the difference between the
two subsections.' 3 5 Section 455(e) forbids judges from accepting a
waiver of any ground for disqualification under subsection 455(b).136
However, when a ground for disqualification "arises only under
§ 455(a), [a] waiver may be accepted .... ,u17
B. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF § 455
Even if § 455 were ambiguous on its face, the legislative history of
the recently amended section suggests that Congress intended to
abandon the extrajudicial source doctrine with respect to § 455(a).
Congress amended § 455 in response to courts' articulation of the
"duty to sit" in close cases and criticism of the prior statute's subjec-
tiveness.' 38 The amended recusal provision, 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), now
permits disqualification of judges even if alleged prejudice is a result
of judicially acquired information, unlike the earlier law which per-
mitted recusal only when thejudge had developed preconceived opin-
ions from extrajudicial sources.' 3 9
In amending § 455, Congress emphasized the importance of re-
storing public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary by broaden-
ing the application of § 455 in favor of recusal.140 Thus, the
underlying goal of § 455(a) is to avoid the appearance of partiality,
regardless of whether partiality exists. 141 For that reason, the source
of the partiality has no bearing on a § 455(a) inquiry.142 Bias or preju-
dice against a party, which arises in the course of a judicial proceed-
ing, is no less inimical to the interests which § 455 (a) safeguards than
is bias which arises elsewhere. 143 Neither Congress, nor any of the
courts which have applied the extra-judicial source doctrine to
§ 455(a), provide any rational basis for believing that an appearance
of bias which arises in a judicial setting is less of a threat to the pub-
lic's confidence in the judiciary than an appearance of bias which
arises extrajudicially.144 As a result, the remedy which § 455(a) pro-
134 See United States v. Chantal, 902 F.2d 1018, 1023 (1st Cir. 1990) (§ 455(a) provides
an independent basis for mandating disqualification which requires no determination of
bias in fact).
135 Litehy, 114 S. Ct. at 1163 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
136 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1988).
137 Id.
138 H.R. REP. No. 1453 at 5; S. REP. No. 419 at 5.
139 United States v. Chantal, 902 F.2d 1018, 1022 (1st Cir. 1990).
140 H.R. REP. No. 1453 at 5; S. REP. No. 419 at 5.
141 See Liteky v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1147, 1161 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
142 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
143 Petitioner's Brief at 15, Liteky (No. 92-6921).
144 Id. at 14.
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vides should be identical. 145
Moreover, Congress explained that § 455 (a) is a "catch-all" provi-
sion: "Subsection (a) of the amended § 455 contains the general, or
catch-all, provision that a judge shall disqualify himself in any pro-
ceeding in which his impartiality might be questioned."146 Subsection
455 (a) cannot logically function as a "catch-all" if an entire category of
bias-that acquired through participation in judicial proceedings-is
automatically excluded from consideration on a motion for recusal. 147
To the extent that § 455(a) is a "catch-all" provision, it is clear that
Congress intended that subsection to be independent of § 455(b),
and also considerably broader. 148 Subsection 455(b) delineates spe-
cific instances of actual bias as well as specific instances of assumed
bias.' 49 In contrast, § 455(a) addresses the appearance of partiality,
guaranteeing that a judge will not sit whenever a reasonable person
would question his impartiality.150 Furthermore, those circuits which
have suggested that courts should read § 455 and § 144 in para materia
ignored Congress' intent, in amending § 455, to liberalize recusal
standards by making § 455(a) a "catch-all" provision.'15  The courts
failed to recognize that § 144 has remained practically unchanged
since its adoption in 1911,152 while § 455 underwent significant
changes in 1974.153 Given the different time frames in which Con-
gress developed the two statutes, it is illogical to claim that the re-
cently amended § 455 and the eighty-three-year-old § 144 are meant
to be read together.
Reading § 455(a) to exclude the extrajudicial source require-
ment is in accord with Congress' intent to abolish a subjective stan-
dard. Subsection (a) looks at the judge's impartiality through the eyes
of a detached reasonable observer, regardless of the subjective intent
of thejudge. 154 The Court's "impossibility of fairjudgment" test bears
little resemblance to the objective standard Congress adopted in
§ 455 (a): whether a judge's "impartiality might reasonably be ques-
tioned." 55 This statutory standard, which the Court preserves for alle-
gations of an extrajudicial nature, looks only for an appearance of
'45 Id. at 15.
146 H.R. REP. No. 1453 at 5; S. REP. No. 419 at 5.
147 Petitioner's Brief at 14, Liteky (No. 92-6921).
148 See H.R. REP. No. 1453 at 5; S. REP. No. 419 at 5.
149 Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1163 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
150 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
151 See H.R REP. No. 1453 at 5.
152 See id.
153 See id.
154 See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1988).
155 Liteky v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1147, 1161 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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partiality.156 The Court's standard, whether fair judgment is impossi-
ble, unlike the statutory standard, demands direct inquiry into the
judge's actual, rather than apparent, state of mind and thus defeats
the underlying goal of the amendments, which is to avoid a subjective
inquiry. 157
Finally, Congress' decision to omit the word "personal" in
§ 455(a) suggests that it did not want the extrajudicial source doctrine
to limit § 455 (a). "[W]here Congress includes particular language in
one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act,
it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and pur-
posely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion."158 The ABA code was
adopted in 1972 in light of a long line of cases holding that "personal"
as used in § 144 meant extrajudicial.159 There is no indication in the
ABA code, the accompanying commentary, or the legislative history of
§ 455 that Congress disapproved of this earlier judicial interpretation
of "personal."160 Against this background, it is clear that by amending
§ 455 Congress intended to transfer the extrajudicial bias limitation
contained in § 144 to § 455(b) (1), but did not intend for it to apply to
§ 455(a).161
The majority in Liteky ignored the legislative history of § 455.
The Court should have reserved judgment until examining this illumi-
nating history. Had the Court done so, it would likely have produced
a more logical and well-reasoned opinion.
C. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
The Court placed undue emphasis on United States v. GrinneV, 62
which provides a weak basis for the extrajudicial source doctrine. Jus-
tice Kennedy, in his concurrence, argued that the extrajudicial source
doctrine has no foundation in the history of recusaljurisprudence. 63
He noted that the term "extrajudicial source," though not the inter-
pretive doctrine bearing its name, has appeared in only one previous
United States Supreme Court case, Grinne/.' 64 In Grinnel/ the respon-
dents moved to recuse the trial judge pursuant to § 144,165 alleging
156 Id. (KennedyJ., concurring).
157 Id. (KennedyJ., concurring). See infra note 187.
158 Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525 (1987).
159 United States v. Coven, 662 F.2d 162, 167-68 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 916
(1982).
160 Id. at 168.
161 Id.
162 884 U.S. 563 (1966).
163 Liteky v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1147, 1159 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
164 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
165 GfinneI 384 U.S. at 580. Section 144 has the same requirement as § 455(b) (1) of
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that the trial judge held a personal bias against them. 66 The Court
denied the claim, stating that "the alleged bias and prejudice to be
disqualifying must stem from an extrajudicial source and result in an
opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge
learned from his participation in the case."' 67 In enunciating the ex-
trajudicial source doctrine, the Court did not erect a per se barrier to
recusal'168 The Court in Grinnell further stated that certain in-court
statements by the judge "reflected no more than his view that, if the
facts were as the Government alleged, stringent relief was called for";
that during the trial, the judge "repeatedly stated that he had not
made up his mind on the merits"; and that another of the judge's
challenged statements did not "[manifest] a closed mind on the mer-
its of the case," but rther was "a terse way" of reiterating a prior rul-
ing.169 Had the Court intended the extrajudicial source doctrine to
be dispositive under § 144, those further remarks by the Court would
have been unnecessary.170
Furthermore, the Court provides little justification for its pro-
nouncement in Grinnell of the extrajudicial source doctrine, since it
relies upon only a single citation to Berger v. United States.171 This cited
passage from Berger, however, stands for the significantly narrower
proposition that the alleged bias "must be based upon something
other than rulings in the case."'1 72 Berger, in turn, relies merely upon
one earlier case, Ex parte American Steel Barrel Co., 173 to support this
narrow proposition. Thus, the Court's reasoning in Grinnell is logi-
cally unsound, because it failed to account for the difference between
a rule requiring that bias arise from an extrajudicial source, and a rule
providing that judicial rulings alone cannot sustain a challenge for
bias. Hence, Grinnell provides a weak basis for reading the extrajudi-
cial source doctrine into § 144.174
The Court should have relied on Liljeberg,175 which indicates that
personal bias or prejudice.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 583.
168 See id.
169 Id.
170 Liteky v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1147, 1159 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
171 255 U.S. 22, 31 (1921).
172 Id.
173 230 U.S. 35, 44 (1913) (the predecessor of § 144 "was never intended to enable a
discontented litigant to oust ajudge because of adverse rulings made, for such rulings are
reviewable otherwise").
174 Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1159 (Kennedy, J., concurring).




courts must read § 455(a) independently of § 455(b).17 6 In Liljeberg,
the respondent sought to disqualify a district judge under § 455(a)
because the judge had a financial interest in the outcome of the litiga-
tion, of which he [thejudge] was not aware.' 7 7 Opposing disqualifica-
tion, the petitioner asked the Court to interpret § 455(a) in light of
§ 455(b) (4), which provides for disqualification only if the judge
"knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary... has a financial inter-
est in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceed-
ing."' 78 The petitioner argued that Congress intended the explicit
knowledge requirement in § 455(b) (4) to govern § 455(a), because
otherwise the knowledge requirement would be meaningless.' 79 In
concluding that the scienter requirement of § 455 (b) (4) is not a limi-
tation upon § 455(a), the Court noted that petitioner's argument ig-
nored important differences between § 455(a) and § 455(b) (4).180
Most importantly, § 455(b) (4) required disqualification no matter
how insubstantial the financial interest and regardless of whether or
not the interest actually created an appearance of impartiality.18 ' To
read § 455(a) as providing that the judge must know of the disqualify-
ing facts, requires not simply ignoring the language of the provision,
which makes no mention of knowledge, but further requires conclud-
ing that the language in § 455 (b) (4), which expressly provides that
judges must know of their interest, is extraneous.18 2 The Court fur-
ther noted that a careful reading of the respective subsections makes
clear that Congress intended to require knowledge under
§ 455(b) (4), but not under § 455(a).18 3 Moreover, advancement of
the purpose of the provision-to promote public confidence in the
integrity of the judicial process-does not depend upon whether or
not the judge actually knew of the facts creating an appearance of
impropriety, so long as the public might reasonably believe that he
knew. 18 4 The goal of § 455(a) is to avoid even the appearance of par-
tiality. Thus, if it would appear to a reasonable person that a judge
has knowledge of facts that would give him an interest in the litigants,
then an appearance of partiality is created even though no actual par-
tiality exists because the judge does not recall the facts.185 In applying
176 See Liljeberg, 486 U.S. 847, 859-60 (1988).
177 Id.
178 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4) (1988).
179 Lijeberg, 486 U.S. at 859.
180 Id. at 861.
181 Id.
182 Id. at 859.
183 Id.
184 Id. at 859-60.
185 Id. at 860.
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the Liljeberg Court's rationale to § 455(b) (1), it is clear that Congress
did not intend (b) (1) to place a limitation on § 455(a).
E. FLAWS IN THE COURT'S HOLDING
Because the Court recognized the unfairness of the extrajudicial
source doctrine, it carved out an exception to the doctrine in certain
circumstances where the judge's actions exhibit "pervasive bias or
prejudice."'8 6 However, the Court admits that it would be rare for a
judge's impropriety to rise to the level of pervasive bias or prejudice,
thus, leaving the extrajudicial source doctrine completely intact.187
For a judge to recuse himself under these circumstances the movant
must show an "impossibility of fairjudgment." Under this threshold, a
§ 455 challenge would fail even if it were shown that an unfair hearing
were likely, because it could be argued that a fair hearing would be
possible nonetheless.' 88 The integrity of the courts, as well as the in-
terests of the parties and public would be ill-served by this nle.189
There are bound to be circumstances where a judge's demeanor or
attitude would raise reasonable questions concerning impartiality, but
would not devolve to the point where one would think fairjudgment
impossible.190 Thus, the Court, in effect, is allowing judges a zone of
immunity in which to voice their prejudices. This, in turn, raises con-
cerns about the accountability of federal judges appointed for life
terms.
F. APPLICATION TO THE FACTS OF THE CASE
The proper, explicitly stated standard for judge recusal is:
"whether the charge of lack of impartiality is grounded in facts that
would create a reasonable doubt concerning the judge's impartiality,
in the mind of a reasonable person."191 In applying this standard
under § 455 (a), the First Circuit in Cowden held that the mere fact
that ajudge has already presided over the separate jury trials of code-
fendants does not constitute reasonable grounds for questioning his
impartiality in a subsequent jury trial involving a remaining defend-
ant.192 The court noted that while judges attempt to shield them-
selves from needless exposure to matters outside the record, they are
necessarily exposed to such matters in the course of ruling on the
186 Liteky v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1147, 1157 (1994).
187 Id. at 1157.
188 Id. at 1161 (Kennedy, J, concurring).
189 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
190 Id. (Kennedy, J, concurring).
191 United States v. Cowden, 545 F.2d 257, 265 (1st Cir. 1976).
192 Id. at 266.
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admission of evidence.1 93 Moreover, the judicial system could not
function if judges could deal but once in their lifetime with a given
defendant or had to withdraw from a case whenever they had presided
in a related or companion case or in a separate trial in the same
case.' 94 However, where ajudge openly exhibited a partisan zeal for
the plaintiff by commenting disparagingly on the defendant's evi-
dence as to plaintiff's contributory negligence in his charge to the
jury, during the taking of testimony, and during defendant's closing
argument, the First Circuit found, in Crowe v. Di Manno,195 that the
judge's activities would lead a reasonable person to believe that the
judge was partial to the plaintiff.196 In finding impropriety on the
part of the districtjudge, the Court of Appeals ordered his recusal.197
Applying the same standard to the facts in Liteky, Judge Elliott
should not have recused himself from the proceedings. The Judge's
actions did not give rise to the appearance of impartiality. Rather, his
actions were merely an attempt at courtroom administration. Unlike
the Judge in Crowe, Judge Elliott did nothing to suggest that he was
biased. Rather, his actions indicate that he was simply trying to ensure
a fair trial, without creating a political forum. Therefore, the Court
properly affirmed the judgment of the lower court, but relied on an
illogical, unprecedented, unsupported rationale for doing so.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Liteky v. United States, the Court applied an extrajudicial source
limitation to § 455 (a) and found that the judge's actions did not re-
quire him to recuse himself from the proceedings. In adopting such
a limitation, the Court ignored the legislative history of the 1974
amendments to § 455. The Court's interpretation was inconsistent
with the purpose of § 455, which is to restore confidence in the judici-
ary. The Court should have abandoned the extrajudicial source doc-
trine as Congress intended, while focusing on the real concern of the
statute-the appearance of impartiality. The Court should have ap-
plied this standard uniformly for intrajudicial and extrajudicial
sources. However, had the Court adopted this standard and applied it
to the facts, the Court would have found, similar to its actual finding,
that the judge did not need to recuse himself from the proceedings.
TONI-ANN CiTERA
193 Id. at 265.
194 Id. at 266.
195 225 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1955).
196 Id. at 658-59.
197 Id.
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